Mitigating Conflicts of Interest – Part 1

In the wake of the Fiduciary Rule’s slow and painful extinction, a new regulatory initiative has emerged front and center, albeit with much less angst and trepidation attached. The SEC's proposed Regulation Best Interest; what one might consider the Commission’s bite at the “fiduciary rule” apple, was released for public comment last spring. The initial reaction to Regulation Best Interest for many was “nothing to see here.” It was difficult to discern how this regulation materially differed from existing regulations and it certainly had far less bite than its Department of Labor predecessor. What Regulation Best Interest does do is mark an apparent shift on the part of the SEC from a scheme of disclosure to a scheme of mitigation and this philosophical change should not be taken lightly.

Regulation Best Interest carves out a distinction between conflicts of interest generally and those arising from financial incentives (it’s safe to say that we care most about the financial incentives). It then imposes a duty on the broker/dealer to identify, disclose, and mitigate the financial incentives. This represents a significant change for brokers who previously relied on disclosure to properly receive compensation that amounts to financial incentives. Adopting policies and procedures to mitigate financial incentives will certainly prove to be more vexing, involve many more moving parts, and cost much more money than putting words on a page. The good news is that at the very same time, changes in the industry are giving B/D firms and their reps more viable options for mitigating conflicts.

 These series of articles will explore various questions emanating from the proposed Regulation Best Interest with a focus on the policies and procedures that are available to properly mitigate financial incentives. The next two articles will look at two prominent methods for conflict mitigation used today: fee levelizing and computer models.